THE ENGLISH LAW OF CAPITAL AND INCOME
The writer has discussed the subject of capital and income
in a series of articles in the Law Quarterly Review.' He now
proposes to repeat what is there said so far as it -may be likely to
prove of interest to American lawyers.

I. UTILITY OF ECONOMIC CONCEPTS OF CAPITAL AND INCOME.
Neither economist, nor lawyer, handles goods, bills of
exchange, bills of lading, charter-parties or insurance policies,
yet both render services of supreme importance to business men
by reducing their business affairs to scientific principles and
evolving the sciences of economics and law.
What is capital or income from the economist's standpoint
may in law be exactly opposite in result, nevertheless economic
scientific theories, it is urged, are of considerable utility to the
lawyer and will become more so as the principles of economics
become enlarged and more adapted for application to business
affairs in our everyday life.
(I) "Capital" used in a concrete sense.
The economist regards "capital" as concrete instruments of
wealth, the lawyer and the business man more or less regard
"capital" as expressed in terms of money. The economist, for
example, envisages the capital employed in a business as consisting of its stock-in-trade, warehouses, and so forth. The
business man when he speaks of his "capital" has in mind capital
in the abstract, capital-value of his assets as disclosed by his
balance sheet. "Capital" to him is an abstract thing, with the
economist it consists of concrete conglomerate entities.
The principles of taxation belong essentially to economists
and, it is urged, a really scientific income tax should be based
on the economic concepts of capital and income, but carried into
practical effect by experienced revenue experts and framed as a
'Economic and Legal Differentiation of Capital and Income, xxvi L. Q.
R. 4o (and see xviii L. Q. R. 274). The Return of a Company's Capital to
its Shareholders, xxvi L. Q. R. 231. Capital and Income (Lifeowner and
Remainderman), xxviii L. Q. R. i75. Capital and Income under the Income

Tax Acts, xxix L. Q. R. 163; and see first chapter of the writer's Digest of
the Law of Trust Accounts.
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legislative measure by skilled lawyers versed in all the intricacies
of the legal system of the country imposing the income tax.
For example, in taxing income from land, the legal draftsman may find it advantageous to visualize the subject-matter as
an economist probably would do; that is, he would conceive land
to be an instrument of wealth, divided vertically into fee simple
and lesser estates and interests, and horizontally into surface and
substratum, the latter including mines, subways, and so forth,
all capable of separate ownership and taxation.
Furnished with a scientific basis and profiting by the experience of revenue experts the legal draftsman would be more
likely to construct an efficient fiscal net so designed that nothing
should escape which was intended to be caught.
The economist's concept of capital as consisting of concrete
things is very valuable in giving effect to the principle of taxation of income "at the source," a method which is calculated to
avoid taxing the same subject-matter twice, which happens under
some systems. Four-fifths of the English income tax is assessed
on this plan and it is said to be one of the chief causes of its
2

success.

The legislator would proceed on the principle of regarding
various instruments of wealth as "capital" with a view to taxing
the flow of income therefrom. He would also consider human
beings as a species of capital, as many economists do, the fees of
a professional singer, or of a state official would therefore be
taxed as income.
He would then provide machinery for taxing income "at
the source," namely, at the point whence it flows from the
"capital" which produces it. Then having taxed "at the source"
the recipient of the income, further machinery will be required
by which that person shall be enabled to recover a ratable proportion from all other persons who benefit by the income stream.
Thus under the English system the income (the rent) of a house
is taxed "at the source." The occupier is assessed as the person
in receipt of the income. Then the occupiei in paying his rent
'The Income Tax, p. 216. Professor Seligman, Columbia University.
The Macmillan Co., New York (i9ix).
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deducts the tax from the landlord. The landlord in turn deducts
a ratable proportion from other persons who derive income (the
rent) from the capital (the house). Thus, if the tax is levied
at the rate i/- in the pound he deducts tax at that rate from the
outgoings he has to pay to a mortgagee for interest, to a rentcharger, portioner or any other legal participant of any part of
the income flow.
If the economist's distinction between "capital" used in an
abstract or concrete sense had been borne in mind some confusion on an important topic of English law would have been
avoided.
It seems to have been assumed at one time that all concrete
assets belonging to a company became in some way its "capital"
and could not be converted into cash and distributed as
dividends.
The case of Lubbock v. British Bank of South Americas
affords a good illustration of that view. A bank had sold part
of its assets for a large sum and proposed to divide the profit.
Thereupon a shareholder applied for an injunction to restrain
the company from dividing the profit "as if it were income."
The judge refused to listen to the shareholder and in the course
of his decision pointed out the fallacious reasoning resulting
from using "capital" in an abstract and "capital" in a concrete
sense. After alluding to the argument of the plaintiff that the
portion of the bank assets sold "was part of the capital of the
company

.

.

.

an accretion to capital, therefore it must be

kept intact as part of the capital," he observed:
"The capital that has to be regarded for the purposes of the
Act of Parliament is the capital according to the Act 4 and not

the things; whether houses, goods, boots or shoes, or hats, or
whatever "itmay be for the time being representing the capital,
in the sense of being things in which the capital has been laid
out."
The writer has summed up his view of the English law on
this subject, as it now stands, as follows: 5
' (x8g) 2 Ch. 198.
'I. e., the subscribed cash capital.
5xxvi L. Q. R. 237.
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"Pretermitting doubtful cases where an application to the
court is expedient, the general conclusion appears to be, assuming that the directors act as honest and reasonably prudent
men should act, that a company can deal with assets relating
to its capital and revenue accounts either as capital or income,
or vice versa, in any way it thinks proper with this exception
that it cannot (unless authorized by order of court) convert
into cash assets representing or which should represent its subscribed capital and return such subscribed capital to the shareholders, since that would violate the implied basis of rights
respectively existing between the company and its shareholders
and the company and its creditors."
(2) "Capital" used in an abstract sense ("Capital Value").
When a lawyer, or business man, speaks of the "capital"
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, he pictures a vast sum representing in dollars the value of the assets of that concern; in other
words, its "capital value." What the economist has in vieWV as
"capital" are the items of concrete things which form the greater
part of the company's assets.
*We learn from the economist that "'capital value" is the
discounted or present value reckoned at-a given time of the expected income from the capital. A trustee is often embarrassed
by the question from a beneficiary whether the values of his trust
investments are likely to rise to those of some decades ago.
Remembering the economic explanation he will reply, "I can
answer your question if you will tell me the general market level
of interest at the date you have in mind." "Capital value" rises
or falls according to the expected value of the income. If the
rate of interest is high "capital value" will be assessed as a lesser
number of years purchase than if it is low. A high rate of
income return therefore means diminished "capital value." A
low rate increases the "capital value."
(3) Economic Differentiation of Capital and Income.
The following definitions modified to meet essential differences in Economics and Law are founded with his approval on
the work 6 of Professor Irving Fisher, of Yale, the leading
economist on the subject:
'The Nature of Capital and Income. The Macmillan Co., New York

(io6).
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Capital is a fund. Income is a flow. A fund of property
existing at an instant of time is called capital. A flow of services
rendered by that capital, for instance, by the payment of money
from it, or any other benefit rendered by a fund of capital in
relation to such fund through a period of times is called income.7
Capital then is a "fund" and income a "flow" from it and
in considering the question when a flow arises and becomes income it will assist us if we keep in mind Professor Fisher's
notion of "detachment."
His thesis is that an increase in "capital value" remains
.capital until it is detached. 8 For example, the profits of a
trader's business consist of the increase in capital-value of the
trader's stock-in-trade between two given dates. 9
After ascertainment and detachment they become income.
So in regard to the profits of a company. In the shape of a
dividend we easily recognize it as income. What has really
happened is that the "capital values" of the company's assets
have increased and when the stockholder cashes his dividends
his share of "capital values" is detached and becomes income.
The-economic theory of "fund" and "flow" and the notion ot
'detachment are, it is suggested, very helpful to the lawyer, but
what, let us inquire, is the legal aspect of the differentiation of
capital and income?
The writer submits that in law after detachment has arisen
the question of whether the detached portion shall be capital or
income resolves itself into one of fact, the relation of the parties,
the particular circumstances of the matter and general usage and
custom all being possible determinants in arriving at a legal
conclusion.
'Illustration: A owns a house (capital). The flow of services rendered by that capital to A in shelter or rent is income.
S'Compare the following passage from Smith v. Hooper, 95 Md. 16
(i9o2), cited in E. A. Howes' The American Law Relating to Income and
Principal: "Increase and Income are not synonymous terms. Until detached or
separated from the shares whose value it enhances increase forms part of
that value and therefore part of the shares and if it be part of the shares
themselves then whilst it may be profit it is in no sense income.""
' A judicial definition of "profit" in In re Spanish Prospecting Co., Lim.
(Ig1), 1 Ch. 98, is to the same effect
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Ifa doctor made a profit by speculating in stock, the business man's probable inference would be that it should be regarded as capital, whereas the same profits made by a stock
jobber would be regarded as income of his business. The same
inference as in regard to the doctor would arise as to profits
made by a company from the sale of land when its business did
not comprise dealing in that commodity.' 0 In further illustration of the writer's conclusion that in law inferences as to what
is to be regarded as capital and what as income are to be drawn
from the particular circumstances of the case, we may select the
examples of terminable annuities and mineral royalties.
Instalments of a terminable annuity are as between lifeowner and remainderman, wasting capital and must be invested,'" the former only taking the income of the investment
(unless-the intention of the donor of the annuity is otherwise).
But a terminable annuity is under the English Income Tax Acts
taxable as income.
. Likewise royalties from minerals are in their nature "capital," the fund of capital being gradually'depleted as the minerals
are worked out and usually as regards a lifeowner of the minerals must be invested as capital,'2 unless the donor of them
intends the lifeowner to enjoy the royalties in specie as income,
but under the English- Income Tax Acts they are taxed as income.
There are some other topics relating to the economic aspect
of our subject to which the writer is desirous of alluding. A
flow of income may be perpetual or may consist of a single jet, a
legal example of the latter is an exceptional bonus dividend taken
by a lifeowner of the stock in respect of which it is paid. Or
it may flow at definite, or indefinite periods, legal examples of
which are timber "thinnings" arising perhaps at long intervals,
or it may be intermittent as in the case of copyhold "fines."
' 0Stevens v. Hudson Bay Co., ioi L. T. 96 (igog). Cf. Dividends of
land companies and profit on a sale of bonds, as between lifeowner and
remainderman. The American Law Relating to Income and Principal, pp.
i6, 38.
1
Crawley v. Crawley, 4 L.

J.

Ch. 265; 4o R. R. 170 (1835).

'In re Ridge (1884), 31 Ch. D. 508. Cf. The American Law Relating to
Income and Principal, p. 5.
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From Professor Fisher we may learn to avoid confusion
in speaking of income by calling the actual income detached
from capital "actual" income to distinguish it from other kinds
of income. For example, the rent of a house to which a lifeowner is entitled is "actual" income, but under English law
income from unauthorized investments yielding say twenty per
cent. will not belong to the lifeowner, he will be entitled to a
lesser income than the "actual" income paid by the company, the
balance being invested as capital.
Finally, in regarding income as a flow, time, "that great
independent variable of human experience," to use Professor
Fisher's words, has to be reckoned with. Thus when a testator
dies every asset forms part of his capital at his death, therefore
interest due on a debt at that date ceases to be income and must
be taken to be capital of his estate.

II.

CAPITAL AND INCOME AS BETWEEN LIFEOWNER AND
REMAINDERMAN."

Questions of capital or income arise more frequently under
this branch of law than under any other, which is not surprising
when one remembers the vast wealth held for persons having
successive interests.
It might have been supposed that some.clear, definite principle would have been laid down, followed and applied in succeeding decisions as a means of distinguishing capital and
income where, as under English law, lifeowner and remainderman are concerned, but this is not so.
The writer submits that the broad principle which should
regulate these questions is the presumed intention of the donor.
This was clearly the principle applied by a very distinguished
judge, Lord Lindley, whose dicta will be quoted later.
The principle now contended for as the basal one which
should govern has been enunciated in decisions relating to (I)
royalties from opened mines; (2) timber thinnings, and (3)
bonuses paid by public companies.
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In regard to the first line of cases, Lord Blackburn, 13 after
referring to Lord Coke as an authority, has said:
"I am inclined to agree

.

. . that the original ground

of all that was that there was supposed to be an irresistible
indication of intention that he who conveyed the property for a
limited time to a person with a limited interest intended him
to work the opened minerals. I am inclined to think that it was
upon that ground that the Courts originally acted throughout,
and I quite agree

.

.

.

'that where there is a sufficient ap-

pearance of intention in the instrument to show either that that
should be restricted, or that it should be extended that intention
would govern."
14
As regards the second line of cases, Lord Justice Bowen
has said:
"The open mine does not constitute an arbitrary exception to real property law. It is merely a well-known principle
of construction in virtue of which grants of mineral land are
given such force and effect as is reasonably necessary to carry
out the obvious intention of the grantor. The grantor was absolute master of his property and could carve the lands which
were the subject of his grant into such estates and interests as
he pleased. It is therefore from his presumed will and intention that the result in the case of the open mine follows."

Then Lord Lindley in a case 15 falling within the third class
of decisions laid down what the writer submits is the broad, and
should be the governing, principle. His Lordship was dealing
with the question whether a certain payment made by a public
company in respect to shares in it which were held for a lifeowner and remainderman was to be regarded as capital or
income:
"What does a man mean when he leaves shares to a tenant
for life? He means that that tenant for life shall have the
income arising from the shares in the shape of dividends or
bonuses declared during the lifetime of the tenant for life. He
does not mean that the tenant for life shall receive profits in
any other sense. He does not mean him to have such profits,
for example, as arise by a realization of shares. He never
"Campbell v. Wardlaw, 8 App. Cas. 645 (1883).
" Dashwood v. Magniac (i8gi), 3 Ch. 36o.
'In re Armitage (1893), 3 Ch. 337, 346.
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dreamed of such profits going to the tenant for life. What he
means is that the tenant for life shall have the income derived
from the dividends or bonuses declared by the company."
Now let us apply Lord Lindley's test of the donor's
intention to the following decided cases.
Illustrations.'
(i) A company in order to equalize dividends declares
them at a uniform rate, accumulates the surplus profits and from
time to time distributes them as "bonus dividends." The dividends are income.
(2) A company increases its capital by issuing new shares
of £Io and appropriates £7. 10. per share out of accumulated
profits in-part payment of them. Shares allotted to the trustees
of a testator's estate (who hold for persons in succession) and
17
thus paid for, are capital.
(3) A company declares a bonus dividend out of accumulated profits, payable in- cash, with an option to apply the dividend in payment of calls on new shares. It was the intention
to declare the whole amount as dividend, but to make provision
by which some of it would be capitalized. The sum paid is
income.'

.

(.) A company has sold its other assets to another company, being in liquidation. The liquidator pays the proceeds of
certain assets, representing accumulated profits, not capitalized,
to its shareholders including the trustees of a will who hold in
-trust for A for life. Such payment is capital. 19
"'For further illustrations see the writer's Digest of the Law of Trust
Accounts, p. iS.
1T
Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385 (887).
Cf. Pennsylvania, New
York and Massachusetts rules as to "stock dividends," see Law of Income
and Principal, p. 26.
13liz re Northage, 64 L. T. 625 (i8gi). Cf. the Pennsylvania rule of
apportionment and the Massachusetts rule against apportionment of extra
dividends and as to option to take cash or new stock, see The Law of Income and Principal, p. 22. In English law the action of the company or
partners is the legal determinant. What is paid as dividend is income, what
is treated by the company as capital is regarded as such between lifeowner
and remainderman. See Digest of the Law of Trust Accounts, chap. 6.
'In
re Armitage, supra, note i5.
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(5) Trustees elected directors of a company by virtue of
shares held by them in trust receive fees as such directors. The
fees are capital.

20

(6) Compensation is paid for a release of restrictive
22
covenants, 21 and of rights attached to a company's shares.
The sums received are capital.
The decisions in the above illustrations rest on various
grounds, but it is submitted that when Lord Lindley's simple
but invaluable test of the donor's presuined intention is applied
the result in each of the above instances will accord with that
judicially arrived at. Under some circumstances the item ir
dispute may be income, but in the above illustrations, except the
first and third, it is inferred that in each case the item is not such
income as the donor intended the lifeowner to take.
In applying this test it is submitted that where "intention is
a matter of inference usage becomes all important" 22 and the
writer would suggest that usage seems to treat ordinary or recurrent flows as income, whilst extraordinary or discontinuous
items are usually regarded as capital. The following definitions
of capital and income, where the relation of lifeowner and
remainderman exists, are based on what has been mentioned in
this article:
(i) "Income" as between lifeowner and remainderman
includes such property or proprietary rights belonging to the
trust estate as the lifeowner is entitled to by the express or implied 24 terms of the trust instrument, by legal intendment,2 5 by
the action of third parties, 26 by statute, 27 custom usage, 28 or
otherwise.
"In re Francis, 92 L. T. 77 (1905).
'=Cowley v. Wellesley, 35 Beav. 64o (1866).

'Bates v. Mackinley, 3 L. J.Ch. 389 (1862).
"Dashwood.v. Magniac, supra, note 14.
I. e., the donor's presumed intention.
'E. g., right of a tenant by the curtesy to work an open mine.
' E. g., partners, or a company.
"E. g., lease fines under Settled Land Acts.
'See above.
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(2)
"Capital" as between lifeowner and remainderman is
any-proprietary right belonging to the trust estate to which the
29
lifeowner is not entitled.
The writer submits the following conclusions as the result
of what has been discussed in the present article in regard to the
subject of capital and income:
(i) From the eminent economist who has been mentioned,
the lawyer may learn to avoid error by recognizing that "capital"
may connote either concrete things, or "capital value" (that is,
the monetary values of them); that capital is a "fund" and
"income" a detachment or flow from that fund.
(2) Whether in law a particular item is capital or is income
is a question of fact to be inferred from the particular circumstances.
(3) -That in deciding the question of fact, where the relation of lifeowner and remainderman -exists, the sound principle
to apply is to inquire whether the donor's probable intention was
that the item in question should go to the lifeowner or be
regarded as capital.
Walter Strachan.
England.
Bristol,
"Prima fade it must be capital unless you can say that it is income in

some way." It: re Francis, supra, note 2o.

